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Philip Kitcher believes it "relatively easy to rebut" the objection that 
his critique of mathematical apriorism presupposes too strong a notion of 
a priori knowledge ([11, pp. 88-9). t After briefly rehearsing his account of a 
priori knowledge in the following section, I will argue in section II that the 
necessary condition of Kitcher's analysis is too strong. I then offer a 
revision of his analysis which turns out to be sympathetic to mathematical 
apriorism. Finally, in section III I argue that my revision is preferable by 
snowing that Kitcher's analysis of a priori knowledge leads to an 
unacceptable conclusion when coupled with his liberal view of the 
importance of social challenges. 
I 
I begin by briefly reviewing Kitcher's account of a priori knowledge. 
First of all, for any knower X with typical human capabilities, and for any 
proposition p, a life is sufficient for X for p if and only if X could have had 
that life and gained the minimal empirical concepts necessary to believe 
that p ([1], p. 22). For example, X could not believe that the sum of the 
angles of a euclidean triangle equals 180 degrees without first having the 
concept of a triangle. Given this notion of a sufficient life, Kitcher 
characterizes a priori knowledge as follows: 
I. X knows a prior that p if and only if 
a. X knows that p 
b. X's belief was produced by a psychological process k 
which is an a priori warrant. 
II. k is an a priori warrant for X's belief that p if and only if given 
any life sufficient for X for p 
a. there is a psychological process b which is of the same 
type as k available for X which could engender X's belief 
that p 
b. if b produces in X the belief that p, then it would warrant 
the belief for X 
c. if b produces in X the belief that p, then p. 
l P. Kitcher, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge (Oxford, 1984). 
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That is, in order for k to be counted as an a priori warrant for p for X it must 
be that in all lives possible for X wherein he has the kinds of cognitive 
capacities distinctive of humans and has gained the necessary concepts, 
an appropriate belief engendering, warranting and reliable psychological 
process of the same type as k is available to X ((11, p. 26). 
Although X's characteristic human capacities must remain invariant 
across the possible lives of interest to Kitcher's analysis, X's intelligence 
may vary across those lives: 
Of course, X might have been more intelligent, that 
is, he might have had better versions of the faculties he 
has. We allow for this type of change. But we are not 
interested in lives where X has extra faculties ((1), p. 26n). 
In light of the foregoing qualification, we may interpret Kitcher's 
analysis of a priori warrants in the following way: k is a priori warrant for X 
for p if and only if in all lives possible for X wherein he has the cognitive 
capacities distinctive of humans—be they enhanced or diminished within 
the bounds characteristic of humans-and has gained the necessary 
concepts, an appropriate belief engendering, warranting and reliable 
psychological process of the same type is available to X. 
Given this brief account of Kitcher's analysis, it is easy to provide the 
canonical argument which he often employs to defeat claims that certain 
psychological processes produce a priori knowledge. To defeat the claim 
that k is an a priori warrant for X for p, delineate a life sufficient for X for p 
wherein X's belief was engendered by a psychological process of the same 
type as k, but in that life the power of the k-type process to warrant p for x is 
defused by direct, theoretical or social challenges. Of course, this is not 
the only way that Kitcher can defeat such a claim; for a given purported a 
priori warrant he could show that for some sufficient life a process of the 
same type is warranting yet unreliable. But the bulk of his critique of 
mathematical apriorism is carried by instances of the above canonical 
argument. 
II 
Consider Sue, an individual of average intelligence, who knows on the 
basis of the standard mathematical proof that there is not greatest prime 
number. Following the proof is engaging in a certain kind of psychological 
process b which engenders in Sue the belief that there is no greatest 
prime. On Kitcher's view, b does not count as an a priori warrant on any 
plausible account of mathematical apriorism. For example, if b is a 
member of a type of platonic intuition, there are sufficient lives for Sue 
where a process indistinguishable from b could engender a false belief in 
the truth of the unrestricted axiom of comprehension. Once more, there 
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are sufficient lives which would suggest the falsity of the proposition that 
there is not greatest prime; it is conceivable that in some life the proof, 
though correct by out lights, may be counted as dubious by a majority of 
Sue's peers. Or perhaps direct or theoretical challenges suggest that the 
proposition is false in some life sufficient for Sue. Hence, there are lives 
sufficient for Sue in which b-type processes would not warrant the belief, 
violating condition (lib) of Kitcher's analysis. So, b is not an a priori 
warrant (111, pp. 62-4)2 
There is another way that Kitcher could argue against the claim that b 
is an a priori warrant. Because Sue's intelligence can vary across lives of 
interest, which is reflected by allowing Sue's cognitive capacity to be either 
enhanced or diminished, we may suppose that there are lives in which Sue 
has much diminished capacities; less euphemistically, Sue is stupid in 
some lives. In lives where mathematical reasoning is not Sue's long suit, a 
b-type process will not be available to her. she may very well know that 
there is no greatest prime by some other means; perhaps she answered 
that question incorrectly on an exam, thereby learning her lesson. The 
existence of such possible lives wherein a b-type process is not available to 
engender beliefs violates condition (11a) of Kitcher's analysis, so b is not an 
a priori warrant. 
I suggest that this result is implausible because Kitcher's necessary 
condition for a priori warrants is too strong. The condition is grounded by 
2 Kitcher does little to specify how process types are to be demarcated, 
noting only that we know intuitively when some outlandish process should 
not be included in a type. Actually, his resistance to providing type identity 
criteria is methodological, for "there is probably no privileged way of 
dividing processes into types" ((1], p. 25). I have chosen to interpret them 
narrowly so that the psychological process which Sue undergoes when 
following the proof that there is no greatest prime is not of the same type 
as the process which she would undergo when (attempting) to follow a 
proof of the fundamental theorem of group homorphisms. That is, two 
processes are of the same type if they are engendered by following the 
same proof. 
It is somewhat disappointing that Kitcher does not attempt to specify 
identity conditions for process types, for that specification is really quite 
important, especially regarding doubts about overlong proofs. Supposing 
that b is a psychological process which results from following a simple 
proof that B while c is a process associated with the following of a complex 
proof that C. Clearly, c may not warrant the belief that C because of, say, 
reasonable doubts expressed by colleagues. If types are interpreted so 
broadly that both b and c fall under the same type, then doubts are cast on 
b by association; if types are specified so narrowly that b and c fall under 
different types, then social challenges to c-types are not challenges to b-
type processes. 
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the requirement that a priori warrants warrant belief against the backdrop 
of any experience. That is, b is an a priori warrant only if no feature of any 
possible life influences the warranting power of b. If some experience 
should influence b's warranting power, then beliefs produced by b are 
dependent upon experience (HI, p. 89). Now, in those lives where a b-type 
process is unavailable to Sue, what experience could influence the 
warranting power of that process? In lives where Sue's capacities are 
diminished the difficulty is not that some recalcitrant experience robbed 
the warranting power of b; it is that engaging in such a process is beyond 
her capabilities. Even if we agree with Kitcher that a priori warrants should 
warrant independent of experience, it is not clear that we want such 
warrants to be independent of cognitive capacity. As it stands, Kitcher's 
necessary condition eliminates processes which are not available in all 
sufficient lives, thereby prejudicing the case against processes which 
would have warranted in the face of any experience, had they been 
available. 
There is an obvious and seemingly painless response which 
circumvents the foregoing objection. Kitcher can restrict the lives of 
interest in his account to those in which Sue is intelligent enough to 
engage in a b-type process, thereby eliminating the lives wherein she had 
diminished capacities, that is, lives where a b-type process is unavailable. 
However, I will now show that a revision of Kitcher's analysis of a priori 
warrants which incorporates this modification is still unsatisfactory. 
Because our previous use of the notion of a life for Sue was somewhat 
intuitive, we begin by making it more explicit. Define a life for Sue (at time 
t) as the total sequence of experiences that she has had (up to t). Let U be 
the set of Sue's possible lives, and let V be the set containing Sue and her 
counterparts ordered with respect to cognitive capacity.3 Define the set B, 
Sue's counterpart set with respect to b-type processes, as the set 
containing those members of V who have sufficient cognitive capacity to 
engage in a b-type process; for brevity, call B Sue's b-counterpart set.4 
Define Borderline Sue to be the member of B who is just intelligent 
enough to engage in a b-type process. That is, given Sue's actual 
3 Note that the use of the notion of a life L in the following, where L e U, 
differs somewhat from the earlier more intuitive usage where L is an 
element of the cross product of U and V. 
4 The extensions of counterpart sets, of course, vary depending upon the 
process type under consideration. Sue is also a member of her b-
counterpart set if she can engage in a b-type process. 
It should be clear that working with Sue's b-counterpart set instead of 
the set of all of her cognitive counterparts incorporates the suggested 
solution to the first objection raised, i.e., that the claimed apriority of a 
warrant should not be rejected if a process of the same type is unavailable 
to a deficient Sue counterpart. 
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capacities, Borderline Sue has the greatest diminished version of those 
capacities possible, yet can engage in a b-type process; Borderline Sue can 
be thought of as the minimum of B. Call the maximum of B Enhanced 
Sue. Given Sue's actual capabilities, Enhanced Sue has the most 
enhanced version of those capacities with the bounds placed on human 
knowers; Enhanced Sue is not supernatural. 
Now, let E a £ U be the set of lives which would not rob a b-type process 
of its warranting power for actual Sue. Similarly, Let E b c U and Ee Q U be 
the sets of lives for Borderline Sue and Enhanced Sue, respectively, which 
would not undermine the warranting power of a b-type process. Finally, we 
can define such a set of lives for any n e B such that E n G U. 
There are some intuitively plausible things that can be said about the 
sets of lives so defined. Because actual Sue has capabilities more 
enhanced than Borderline Sue, there are experiences which would 
undermine the warranting power of a b-type process for the latter, but not 
for the former. Similarly, there will probably be fewer experiences that 
undermine the process for Enhanced Sue than for actual Sue. Thus: 
(1) E b £...eE a £...eE E GU. 
Further, it seems reasonable to suppose that if no experience could affect 
the power of a process to warrant belief for actual Sue, then processes of 
the same type would be warranting against the backdrop of any 
experience for any cognitively augmented counterpart of Sue. 
We can employ this machinery to characterize Kitcher's necessary 
condition concerning a priori warrants. In order for b to be an a priori 
warrant for Sue's belief that there is no greatest prime it must be that: 
C) E b = . . . . = Ea = . . . =E a = U, 
that is, regardless of the cognitive capacity of any member of Sue's b-
counterpart set, in no life will a process of the b-type be undermined. By 
contraposition, a b-type process would not be an a priori warrant if it 
happens that for some n € B, E n c U. So, for example, if some experience 
would undermine the warranting power of a b-type process for Borderline 
Sue, then b is not an a priori warrant for actual Sue's belief in the prime 
theorem, even if no experience could undermine the power of that process 
for actually Sue, or for every augmented Sue counterpart. So, if the E-sets 
were related in this manner: 
(3) E b c . . . c E a = . . . = E a = U, 
then, on Kitcher's view, b is not an a priori warrant for actual Sue. 
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Assuming that warranted belief which is not a priori is dependent 
upon experience, or a posteriori, we can derive the following sufficient 
condition for a posteriori warrants from Kitcher's analysis: 
For any cognizer X, and any proposition p, if a 
psychological process K warrants X's belief that p, but E„ 
c U for some member of X's k-counterpart set, then k is 
an a posteriori warrant for X's belief that p. 
I submit that this is an unsatisfactory sufficient condition for a posteriori 
warrants, and conclude that it is so because Kitcher's necessary condition 
for a priori warrants is overly strong. 
There are psychological processes which, as warrants, are. 
uncontroversially a posteriori, perceptual processes serve as a fine 
example. The distinguishing feature of such warrants is that regardless of 
an individual's cognitive endowment, there will always be an experience 
that could undermine the warranting power of the process-that's what it 
means to say that beliefs are dependent upon experience. If we were to 
define the E-sets for a cognizer X in order to illustrate this characteristic of 
dependent warrants, they would be related as follows: 
(4) E b c . . . c E a c . . . c E a c U , 
indicating that all of the E-sets are proper subsets of U, the set of X's 
possible experiences. The sufficient condition which follows form Kitcher's 
analysis is inadequate because it can be satisfied not only by warrants 
which, like perceptual processes, are clearly a posteriori, but also by 
processes whose E-sets are related in the manner of (3). That is, the 
condition derived from Kitcher's account allows some warrants which, in 
fact, would warrant against the backdrop of all experience for some 
cognitive counterpart of X to be a posteriori simply because some 
cognitively deficient counterpart finds the process unwarranting. 
Kitcher's view suggests that some processes can be "cryptodependent 
warrants" in the sense that they could warrant against the backdrop of any 
experience for some members of X's counterpart set, yet be undermined 
by experience for cognitively deficient members of the set. The reason 
behind my designation is obvious if no experience could undermine the 
warranting power of the process in which actual Sue engages, but some 
experience would subvert the process for a non-existent deficient 
counterpart, then the fact that the process is a dependent warrant is, so to 
speak, hidden. But for all practical purposes, crypto-dependent warrants 
are a priori warrants if one ignores all of the deficient counterparts who 
find the process unwarranting in some life. Ignoring these counterparts 
seems to be in line with the previously expressed intuition that a priori 
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warrants should warrant independent of experience, not cognitive 
capacity. Hence, I hold that crypto-dependent warrants are a priori. 
I suggested earlier that a more natural sufficient condition for a 
posteriori warrants could be characterized as follows: 
For any cognizer X, and any proposition p, if a 
psychological process k warrants X's belief that p, and E„ 
c U for all members n of X's k-counterpart set, then k is 
an a posteriori warrant for X's belief that p. 
I will use this characterization to motivate a revision of Kitcher's analysis of 
a priori warrants. By contraposition, a necessary condition for a process k 
being an a priori warrant is that for some member n of X's k-counterpart 
set it is the case that E n = U. In other words, X must have at least one 
cognitive counterpart for whom a process of the same type cannot be 
undermined by experience. Because we assumed initially that there will 
probably be fewer experiences that subvert the process for augmented 
counterparts of X than for actual X, we focus on how different experiences 
would affect the warranting power of the process for Enhanced X; if E e c U, 
then for some life available to Enhanced X the warrant is undermined (and 
will be so for every other member of X's k-counterpart set by assumption), 
so the process is an a posteriori warrant for X. However, if Eg = U, then the 
warrant is either a priori or crypto-dependent, hence, on my interpretation 
an a priori warrant for X's belief that p. I would therefore suggest the 
following analysis of a priori knowledge given that Enhanced X is the 
maximum of X's counterpart set with respect to X's ability to engage in a k-
type process: 
I. X knows a priori that p if and only if 
a. X knows that p 
b. X's belief was produced by a psychological process k 
which is an a priori warrant. 
II. k is an a priori warrant for X's belief that p if and only if given 
any sufficient life for Enhanced X. 
a. if a k-type process produces in Enhanced X the belief 
that p, then it would warrant the belief for Enhanced X 
b. if a k-type process produces in Enhanced X the belief 
that p, then p. 
This reformulation is sympathetic to the mathematical apriorist as the 
following illustrates. Suppose that given Sue's actual cognitive endowment 
some recalcitrant social challenge could undermine the warranting power 
of the b-type process which, in fact, warrants her belief that there is no 
greatest prime. That is, E a c U; the set of experiences that would not 
subvert the process for actual Sue is a proper subset of the set of her 
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possible lives. May we decide from this that the warrant for Sue's belief is 
not a priori? No, for it could be crypto-dependent; perhaps for some 
cognitively augmented member of Sue's b-counterpart set no experience, 
including the social challenge to which actual Sue is susceptible, could 
undermine the warranting power of the process. In order to determine 
whether or not the b-type process which warrants her belief is crypto-
dependent, hence a priori, we must consider Enhanced Sue, for if the 
warrant is dependent it will be the case that E e c U, if the warrant is a priori, 
then E e = U. 
Ill 
There is further reason to accept my proposed analysis of a priori 
warrants over Kitcher's: his necessary condition is so strong that it is not 
clear that any proposition can be known a priori, for it is always possible to 
conceive of some sort of social challenge which would defuse the 
warranting power of a psychological process for some cognitive 
counterpart of a typical human knower. That is, Kitcher's analysis of a 
priori warrants, coupled with his liberal view of the importance of social 
challenges, entails that there probably are no a priori warrants-a welcome 
result for some, but seeming not for Kitcher, himself. 
Kitcher takes a rather liberal view of the importance of social 
challenges to claims that certain beliefs are a priori because of the almost 
impossible task of providing an adequate criterion of significance for 
experiences where are relevant to assessing the apriority of beliefs. "[For 
the apriorist) it would be obviously futile if (such a) principle of exclusion 
ruled out so many experiences that vast portions of our knowledge were 
hailed as . . . a priori" ((1], p. 89). However, placing no exclusions on 
experiences runs the very real risk of rendering meaningless the notion of 
a priori knowledge, for probably no warrants could survive the rigors of all 
conceivable social challenges for all of a congnizer's counterparts. 
Even one of Kitcher's preferred items of a priori knowledge can be 
challenged with some straightforward conjuring. He asserts that: 
I think that one can make a powerful case for 
supposing that some self-knowledge is a priori. At most, 
if not all, of our waking moments, each of us knows of 
herself that she exists ((1], p. 29). 
Now, suppose that Sue knows of her own existence on the basis of a 
process r which is type of self-reflection. Again, r is an a priori warrant only 
if in the face of every possible social challenge the process is still 
warranting. Suppose further that in some sufficient life Sue finds herself a 
member of native tribe which holds the bizarre belief that only the tribe's 
deity exists, and its existence is affirmed whenever anyone is self-
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reflective. Other beliefs might be naturally engendered by the process, 
but religious dogma teaches that these are false. Once more, the tribe 
openly denounces and painfully punishes all members who question this 
religious belief. In the face of these kinds of social pressures it is not clear 
that an r-type process could be warranting. 
This story is really quite fantastic; it is so because we are convinced 
that no experience could ever challenge the warranting power of self-
reflection. But is there any way that we could ever anticipate every 
possible social challenge, knowing in advance how compelling they could 
be for Sue? 
If it is desirable to preserve the notion of a priori knowledge and the 
substance of a psychologists epistemology, while avoiding the task of 
distinguishing relevant social challenges, then I believe that the analysis of 
a priori warrants that I have proposed is in order. My revision of Kitcher's 
view revives the notion of a priori knowledge because crypto-dependent 
warrants would still count as being a priori in spite of the fact that they 
cannot pass muster against some experiences for cognitively deficient 
counterparts. 
Sue has agreed to illustrate. As before, Sue's r-counterpart set will 
contain those counterparts who have sufficient cognitive capacity to 
engage in an r-type process, as well as Sue herself. Now, we have seen that 
on Kitcher's account it is unlikely that r could count as an a priori warrant 
for Sue's belief that she exists, for we can imagine experiences possible for 
Sue which would undermine the power of an r-type process to warrant. 
Again, these experiences come in the form of perverse social challenges. 
However, on the view which 1 recommend, arguing that a process is 
not an a priori warrant because some perverse experience could 
undermine the r-type process for Sue, given her actual cognitive 
endowment, is insufficient. We need to assess whether any possible 
experience could affect the warranting power of self-reflection for Enhance 
Sue, the maximum of Sue's r-counterpart set. Unfortunately, we can only 
speculate about the effects of social challenges on Enhanced Sue, but we 
can say this much: if there's any Sue counterpart for whom the r-type 
process will be warranting against the backdrop of any experience, it will 
be Enhanced Sue. I tend to believe that Enhanced Sue could see through 
the natives's religious dogma.5 
From the foregoing considerations, a happy result follows for the 
mathematical apriorist. On my view, social challenges do not pose the 
kind of serious threat to apriorism which Kitcher envisions, even though on 
5 One may object that Kitcher makes it too hard for a process to be an a 
priori warrant, but my account makes it impossible to tell when a process is 
an a priori warrant. This has bite, of course, only if it is necessary for us to 
recognize that a warrant is a priori in order for it to be a priori. 
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some occasions the warranting power of a purported a priori process is 
undermined by experience. 
